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Organization Theory and Military Metaphor: Time for a 
Reappraisal? 
 
Abstract 
 
A ‘conventional’ use of military metaphor would use it to convey attributes such as 
hierarchical organisation, vertical communication and limited autonomy. This is 
often used in contrast to a looser form of organisation based on the metaphor of the 
network. However, this article argues that military practice is more complex, with 
examples of considerable autonomy within the constraints of central direction. It is 
suggested that not only might this be a more useful metaphor for many contemporary 
organizations, but also that simplistic uses of military metaphor divert our attention 
away from the functions that management hierarchies play. The discussion is 
embedded within a critical realist account of metaphor, arguing for both its value and 
the need for its further development.  
Introduction 
 
 
The development of theory is language borne; language is profoundly metaphorical in 
character (Lopez, 2001, 2003b; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). If we accept these two 
assertions, then the character of the metaphors that we use in developing theories 
about how organizations operate needs to be laid open to scrutiny. Metaphors carry 
with them a weight of association, symbolism and imagery that, if not scrutinised, 
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have the potential to lead our inquiries astray or render them rather less productive 
than we would like. One of the central sources for models, analogies and metaphors in 
the development of organization theory has been the domain of military practice and 
theory. Terms like the distinction between ‘line’ and ‘staff’, for example, or ‘rank and 
file’ owe their origins to analogies with military practice. In this article, I want to 
explore the use of military metaphor in the inter-twined areas of strategy and 
structure. There is, I will argue, a ‘conventional’ use of such metaphors that draws on 
a widespread reading of military practice. In that reading, strategy is reserved for and 
devised by a small group of senior officers and implemented in a disciplined fashion 
by lower ranks. In this reading, structure follows on from strategy and comprises a 
command and control structure, represented visually by the classic organisational 
pyramid. That such a reading forms a part of conventional thinking about 
management and that it reflects part of military practice is not denied, but research 
into the formation of organizational strategy suggests alternative readings of at least a 
significant part of military practice.  I hope to show both the extent of the 
conventional reading and the interesting questions posed by a different reading. In 
particular, I will suggest that an alternative model of military practice that suggests a 
degree of autonomy within a strong regimental culture whilst retaining the potential 
for tight central discipline might form a more useful way of looking at contemporary 
business organisations than the customary polarization between hierarchies and 
networks.  
 
The material on the use of metaphor in organizational analysis suggests a number of 
approaches. There has been considerable interest in exploring the literary devices that 
might be used, going beyond the use of metaphor to explore, for example the potential 
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of paradox and irony to shed new light on organizational practice. (Oswick, Keenoy 
and Grant, 2002). For the purpose of this article, I am using the term ‘military 
metaphor’ to refer to any form of analogical reasoning from military practice to that 
of organizations, whilst recognising the very important debate about the varieties of 
metaphor and their place within the deployment and development of rhetoric 
(Tsoukas, 1993; Alvesson, 1993; Oswick and Grant, 1996; Inns, 2002). From this 
focus on the nature and value of different literary devices there has also developed an 
important emphasis on the generation of new types of analogy that will, it is 
suggested, help with the process of organizational change (Sackman, 1989). However, 
Mangham (1996) has argued that that there is a limit to this process and that we may 
obtain more value from closer attention to the more widely used conventional 
metaphors, an argument that has some influence on the exploration of military 
metaphor that I engage in here. The main concern of the article is with the use of 
military metaphors in organizational theory, as opposed to the way in which they are 
used in organizations themselves. Before bracketing the question of ‘metaphor-in-
use’, however, it is useful to recognise the performative nature of metaphors. 
 
 In organizational practice, metaphors drawn from a wide range of domains are used 
with little regard to their origins. That is, the use of metaphor by organizational actors 
escapes its conditions of production. Those actors may have no knowledge of the 
practices from which the metaphor was derived, and this is of no consequence for 
their use of the metaphor. The important issue, therefore, is not whether their use of 
metaphor is ‘accurate’ with regards to the domain of origin, but the performative 
effects that its use has. Take for example, the following drawn from a large banking 
group in the United Kingdom: 
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 I find that probably HOB is like largely conservative, [HOB's parent banking 
group] has got a command-control type of structure, almost a military type of 
structure and that type of structure doesn't react well to changes of this nature 
(Knights et al, 2002: 102). 
 
We, broadly speaking, know what the speaker means in his use of ‘almost a military 
type of structure’. His analogy creates images of uniformed officers giving orders 
which will be obeyed because of their rank, and we can transfer these images to a 
world of suits and wood-panelled boardrooms. In such cases, what we might be 
interested is not whether practice in the organization is actually like military practice, 
but what effects such language use has on action within the organization. We might 
point out that the view of military life that is being deployed is inaccurate or 
misleading, or that it has become divorced from changes in military practice, but the 
usage has gained a life of its own. When a former area manager in control of a 
number of managed public houses, (in observing that it was rare in the 1960s for 
public house managers to become area managers), comments ‘That was not 
particularly acceptable because the areas were so small [that] you were known and it 
was felt that you couldn’t transfer from to being soldier to an officer’, we can suggest 
that  a particular view of organizational life, one that rests on an acceptance of 
discipline and its maintenance, is being deployed.1 
 
And, of course, we could apply the same strictures to the use of metaphor in 
organizational analysis. Some might argue that the relations between the metaphors 
we use and the domain of origin might seem of little importance. In the case of those 
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who are arguing for the potential of metaphor in organizational transformation, what 
is of importance is how they enable us to think differently about the world of 
organizations (Sackmann, 1989; Morgan, 1997). However, we need to consider the 
performative nature of metaphor in our analyses. That is, a taken-for-granted use of, 
for example, the ‘military=mechanical” analogy might influence the rest of our 
analysis, possibly, as will be argued below, by setting up a misleading polarisation of 
organizational models.  We might want to pay some attention to the words of warning 
supplied by Inns and Jones who counsel that ‘it may be necessary to unpack a 
metaphor for its meaning and check understanding before it is used for analysis’ (Inns 
and Jones, 1996: 123). For simply because our language use is saturated in metaphor 
does not mean that we cannot judge between the adequacy of different metaphors and 
judge some more useful than others. This call for precision in our use of metaphor, for 
an awareness of the commitments that they bear with them, should not be taken to 
support the position that we might broadly called ‘scientific realism’, a position that 
seeks to expunge metaphor from our scientific vocabulary (Inns, 2002). Such a 
position is untenable and unproductive given what we know about language use. As 
Lopez persuasively argues from a basis in critical realism, theoretical writing is not a 
transparent process of rendering thought visible. The language that is used shapes that 
thought, entangled as it is in a network of references. As he notes  
 
theoretical writing resists our desire for clarity and transparency by denoting 
and connoting more than we intend. It engenders connections that we have not 
consciously or actively willed, connections that may very well undermine the 
theoretical effect we are trying to achieve or perhaps achieve more than we 
thought was possible (Lopéz, 2003b: 144).  
 7
 Such a focus on language may come as a surprise to those who confuse critical, 
realism with the ‘scientific realism’ espoused by some in organizational analysis 
(McKelvey, 2003). However, critical realists do not argue that our knowledge of the 
world is based on direct access to that world. Rather, they contend that our knowledge 
is socially constructed and so language and metaphor play a central part in that 
construction. Indeed, in domains such as economics it has been critical realists who 
have argued trenchantly for the need to use analogical reasoning to develop theory 
and practice (Lewis, 1999). Their efforts in this regard can be grounded in the work of 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980), whose account of the origins of metaphor lays particular 
stress on the role of embodied experience of the world. As they suggest ‘the structure 
of our spatial concepts emerges from our constant spatial experience, that is, our 
interaction with the physical environment. Concepts that emerge in this way are 
concepts that we live by in the most fundamental way’ (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 
56).  Of course, the subsequent development and application of metaphor in the social 
world elaborates our stock of metaphors, but this is a useful reminder that language 
exists in relationship to external referents and is not an enclosed system. Hence, 
critical realists can comfortably engage with critical discourse analysts in advocating 
the need to take semiosis (‘the intersubjective production of meaning’) seriously 
(Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer, 2002: 2). In this endeavour it is suggested that we need 
to consider ‘extra-discursive conditions of existence and effectivity (Fairclough, 
Jessop and Sayer, 2002: 9). That is, an understanding of the nature of the language 
that we use and its entailments does not mean that we are simply trapped in networks 
of metaphors and their referential networks. Rather, it suggests that we should open 
our use of metaphors to inspection, to examine the nature of what they denote and 
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connote. This article, then, is concerned with our use of military metaphor in 
organizational theory and not with the use of such metaphors in practice by 
organizational actors. It is concerned in particular with the ways in which the use of 
military metaphor might constrain our analysis or perpetuate the use of untenable 
dualisms. 
 
What the article seeks to argue is that a dominant use of military metaphor in 
organizational theory is to present a picture of organizations as subject to command 
and control, with strict hierarchies. Such images are then counter-posed to more fluid 
analogies, particularly those based on networks. Network organisations, characterised 
by empowerment and lateral communication, with shifting constellations of project 
teams, forming and disbanding in line with ever-changing goals, are held to 
characterise the ‘Information Age’ (Castells, 2000; Ransome, 1999). But what if 
military practice is not all about command and control? What if there are alternative 
models of practice which emphasise relative autonomy? And what if such models 
suggest more helpful ways of looking at organizations in the contemporary world? 
What, that is, if our concentration on command and control models has lead us to 
posit a false bi-polar scale, one which over-emphasises the degree of empowerment 
and the lack of hierarchy in contemporary organizations? In the rest of this article, I 
seek to supply some evidence to support the contentions made and to provide some 
arguments based on the alternative models that this discussion reveals. Briefly, I will 
outline the evidence for the dominance of the command and control model. I will 
suggest that there is a ‘taken for granted’ position that underplays the complexity to 
be found in the work of, for example, Urwick. I then develop this argument about the 
complexity of military practice by supplying some brief details of the development of 
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light infantry practice and theory. This presents us with an alternative source of 
analogies which are then applied to contemporary organizational practice, with the 
aim of providing some answers to the questions just raised. 
 
Military metaphor: the conventional position 
 
It would be easy to start this discussion by looking at a standard management text, 
such as Hannagan (1998) and explore the influence of our conventional military 
model on the discussion of organizational structure and practice. However, this would 
be to fall into the trap of the simple polarisation that I argue characterizes much of the 
use of military analogy. A more interesting and complex example, which I select in 
part because I am familiar with it and in part because I think that it demonstrates the 
prevalence of an equation of military practice with hierarchy and control is a popular 
text on systems thinking and information, Mike Harry’s (2001) Business Information : 
A Systems Approach. I chose this because it explicitly uses military analogy as 
arguing for what is seen as wrong with mainstream managerialist work. In distinction 
to the counter-posing of a simple ‘systems-control’ to a processual-relational 
perspective that is often found in more critical works on organizations (Watson and 
Harris, 1999), I would argue that Harry’s book attempts to supply a more nuanced 
discussion, trying hard to argue that the notion of hierarchy in systems thinking is not 
isomorphic with organizational hierarchy. His discussion of organizational hierarchy 
starts with the interesting statement, for our purposes,  that ‘many early management 
gurus, like Urwick (1943), saw this business of management very much in military 
terms’ (Harry, 2001: 19). Setting aside for now the accuracy or otherwise of this 
characterization of Urwick (whose work we return to below), what Harry does is to 
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argue that mainstream writers (his main example is Hannagan (1998)) use military 
practice to construct their pyramidical diagrams of the various levels of management. 
Such diagrams, characterized by Harry as ‘the author’s academic enemy no. 1’, set up 
false divisions between managers, with the attribution to some of ‘strategic’ decisions 
and to others of ‘operational’ decisions, based on their position in the hierarchy 
(Harry, 2001: 17). ‘In an information age,’ he argues, ‘this is easily shown to be 
nonsense, even if it were ever true’ (Harry, 2001: 19). The need is to move away from 
such sterile metaphors to more appropriate ones, in his case ones based on systems 
thinking. What Harry is doing is suggesting that military practice is redundant as a 
source of analogies, leading as it does to false positions that do not help contemporary 
managers. Military practice here is equated with a rigid command and control 
structure in which strategic decisions are taken by those at the top, an inappropriate 
model for organizations competing in more fluid times. A similar emphasis can be 
found in Claudio Ciborra’s discussion of the creation of formal strategies He points to 
their roots in military thinking, characterised by a focus on neatness, structure and 
articulation. He explicitly contrasts this way of thinking to ‘tactics, ruses, 
improvisations, of which drifting is the product and outcome, [which] are contingent 
procedures indexed by the here and now, and meaningless outside a specific time-
tagged situation.' (Ciborra, 2002: 93). These examples use the military metaphor to 
conjure up an image of discipline and control, in which initiative is subordinated to a 
desire for order. In doing so, they draw upon a powerful image that represents a good 
deal of military practice and history. But not, it could be argued, all of that practice 
and history. However, a review of the way in which military metaphor has been used 
would indicate that it is generally used to conjure up the images associated with it by 
Harry and Ciborra.  
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 We can find some examples of direct transfer of military examples into the domain of 
business organisations, and these examples are in the general area of business 
strategy. Of course, there is the widespread popularity of Sun Tzu’s Art of War as 
applied to business practice (Krause, 1995). In an example drawing on more recent 
practice , Clemons and Santamaria (2002) argue that business leaders ought examine 
recent developments in military strategy, with their focus on manoeuvre, and apply 
these to their own practice. They have limited comments to make on the implication 
of such applications for the internal life of organisations. (As do Ries and Trout 
(1986) in their aggressive espousal of military practice). Of course, the classic work 
of R. N. Anthony (1964) might be taken as the seminal example of the transfer of 
military models to organisational analysis, with the categorisation of business 
decisions into strategic, tactical and operational levels. Indeed, the book has an 
appendix that explicitly compared current military thinking on strategy with that of 
some business writing. From this comparison Anthony concludes ‘business 
management should be able to profit from what the military has already learned and 
published.’ This is taken further, as he argues that ‘Even more important, the way in 
which the military does strategic planning, especially the functions of the staff, should 
be carefully explored by some who are interested in possible business applications 
(Anthony, 1964: 27). However, we should note that Anthony is more cautious when it 
comes to applying lessons from the military to other levels of the organisation. He 
specifically points out that to equate his ‘management control’ or ‘tactical’ level of 
decision making with the military sense of ‘tactics’ ‘has a serious defect. A military 
tactical maneuver has a definite beginning and end, whereas the management control 
process relates to a recurring cycle of operations’ (Anthony, 1964: 56). The value of 
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the military metaphor is therefore seen largely in the context of the interaction of the 
organisation with its environment, with rather less being said about the consequences 
for internal organisation. In this, the work can be seen to follow the dominant 
emphasis of the ‘planning’ school on the way in which structure follows strategy. (For 
the classic statement of this, see Chandler (1962); for a useful recent discussion, 
Whittington, 2001).  In such an emphasis, the internal arrangements follow from the 
construction of strategy and so are taken for granted: the connections with the root 
metaphor are not explored. However, works such as that of Gareth Morgan (1997) on 
organisational metaphor sit in a tradition that emphasises the role of management 
choice in the production and reproduction of organisational structure and culture. 
Such work is much more concerned with the ways that metaphor shapes the learning 
and practice of organisations; however, what we find here is a relatively under-
developed exploration of military metaphor. 
 
An example of the tendency to take military metaphors as unproblematic can be found 
in the discussion by Dunford and Palmer (1996) of metaphors in the discourse on 
corporate restructuring. Their analysis indicated that, particularly in justifying the 
need for change, there was an emphasis on ‘imagery with strong military/violence 
overtones, that is not uncommon in the strategy literature’. (Dunford and Palmer, 
1996: 99). What is problematic here is the coupling of ‘military’ with ‘violence’. 
What this fails to do is to discriminate between metaphors that derive from 
generalised images of violence, those which are based on the more specific terrain of 
warfare and those which are based on military practice. Instead, these are read as 
being isomorphic. That this causes problems might be illustrated by the fact that at 
least one metaphor that they pick up, that of ‘slash and burn’ is included by them both 
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under the heading of ‘military/violence’ and under ‘horticultural’(Dunford and 
Palmer, 1996: 103). Within their category of responses to the external world they cite 
the following: ‘'declare war on competitors', 'combat tenacious global competitors', 
'combat rising costs', turn up the heat on competitors'’(Dunford and Palmer, 1996: 
100). Whilst we can clearly see that one of these draws directly on war, the other three 
seem to be more generalised examples of violence. None draws directly on military 
practice, in that the forms of violence that they draw upon could also be waged by 
other groups. When they turn to the internal condition of organisations, they give a 
graphic list of 24 examples, many of which are clearly violent in inspiration – words 
such as ‘killing fields’, ‘slaughtering’, ‘bloodletting’, etc. However, whilst such 
images might be the result of military action, they are far from being only associated 
with it. Indeed, of these 24 words and phrases, only ‘frontal assault’, ‘firing line’ and 
‘thinning the ranks’ are directly related to military practice (Dunford and Palmer, 
1996: 102). When we recall the examples given by our organizational actors and by 
Harry and Ciborra, then the aspects of military practice that might have more 
relevance for thinking about organizational practice are those to do with the nature of 
decision making and the relation of this with organizational structure and action. The 
rather casual and sweeping use of the term ‘military’ can conceal those aspects which 
have more purchase on organizational analysis.  
 
A similar set of assumptions can be found in those accounts which tend to equate 
military practice with a mechanical model of organizing (Thomas, 2003). Whilst 
Morgan’s classic account of metaphor does recognise in his discussion of military 
practice that ‘in time, further refinements were introduced, including the idea of 
decentralizing controls to create greater autonomy of parts in different combat 
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situations’ (Morgan, 1997: 16), the bulk of his discussion is about the relationship of 
military practice to  mechanistic models of organisation. His discussion is largely 
based on principles of military organisation drawn from the writing of Frederick the 
Great. Morgan notes that ‘Frederick's aim was to shape the army into an efficient 
mechanism operating through means of standardized parts’ (Morgan, 1997: 16). From 
this he argues that subsequent views of organisation drew on such arguments to 
construct mechanistic views of organisation, characterised by rigid definitions of 
functions and tight control through hierarchies. The transmission mechanism was 
writers such as Fayol, Mooney and Urwick, as ‘each theorist codified his insights, 
drawing on a combination of military and engineering principles’ (Morgan, 1997: 18). 
The extent of the relative contributions of military and engineering principles is a 
point to which we can return. However, it is Morgan’s insight about the developments 
following Frederickian practice that suggests a little more complexity to military 
practice that we need to explore. It is informative to start our examination of this 
complexity with the figure of Lyndall Urwick. 
 
The complexity of military practice 
 
Military experience certainly appears important for Urwick, known as he was by the 
title of Colonel (a title awarded to him as a civilian during the Second World War) 
during his management consulting activity. A set of biographical notes drawn up 
about him in 1958 comments that ‘Urwick still startles the business leaders he talks to 
by drawing his examples of leadership morale, organisation and training, not from 
industry but from his own military experiences in the first world war’ (Cited in Roper, 
2000: 202). If we examine his Elements of Administration, we indeed find numerous 
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examples drawn from military practice. However, in the context of our discussion so 
far, it is interesting to note that Urwick both points out the departure of military 
practice from the strict application of a rigidly hierarchical model and uses military 
practice to point to contrasts within civilian life. Under the first heading, for example, 
he points out that successful military communication does not adhere to the dictates of 
a rigid organisation chart: 
 
 The "proper channels, the official channels," were there and were used to 
confirm and to record agreement already reached by far quicker and friendlier 
means of communication. If an officer had to use them before that point was 
attained, it was rightly regarded as a confession of failure, an admission that 
his organisational arrangements were not supported by good personal relations 
(Urwick, 1947: 47). 
 
Under the second, he is anxious to point out that military discipline has often to be 
rigid because the ‘law of the situation’ makes it so. However, by contrast, he argued 
‘There is in fact no reason whatever why all discipline of this character which is 
necessary should not be imposed by consent’ (Urwick, 1947: 95) What Roper (2000) 
points out is the different role that military experience played in Urwick’s life and 
work. At times the value of staff work is played up and Urwick’s traumatic front line 
experience is pushed into the background; at other times the front line experience is 
given more prominence. Once again, this is not a homogeneous military practice that 
is drawn upon, but a fragmented one, subject to debate and interpretation. He also 
points out that Urwick was not a career Army officer, but a reservist who came from a 
family owned manufacturing company. This might suggest that temporally the idea of 
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‘engineering’ is more important for the development of mechanistic forms of thought 
about organisations than military analogies. Urwick, for example, gives this priority 
over his military examples, arguing that  ‘the mechanistic parallel can be very helpful 
in discussing organisation. Another name for it, of course, is “the engineering 
approach”’ (Urwick, 1947: 35). Yehouda Shenhav’s recent account of the growth of 
management as a profession in the USA suggests the importance of  engineering. He 
argues that that ‘engineers used intensified periods of labor unrest to sell the agenda 
of management systems to reluctant employers and the public at large.’ (Shenhav, 
1999: 175). In presenting this model of organizations as technical-rational systems to 
be administered by engineers, they employed mechanistic models of organizations 
drawn from engineering practice and so helped shaped the nature of those 
organizations.  As Tsoukas (1993: 333) suggests  
 
 there must be something else [other than the nature of metaphor itself] which 
accounts (partially at least) for the predominance of the machine metaphor. In 
all probability, this can be found in the rules underlying the operation of 
modern socio-economic systems and institutions. 
 
  
Whilst, then, military practice might have been used as a metaphor for such 
mechanistic organizational practices, this might be misleading. This is not only in the 
treatment of ‘conventional’ military practice, but in the substitution of one model of 
military practice for a variety of practice. That is, military practice and organization is 
not homogeneous. What I have termed as the ‘conventional’ picture consists of a 
tightly structured organization in which there are clear lines of decision making. 
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Strategic decisions are taken by a small group of senior officers and the 
‘implementation’ of these decisions is a question of the giving of orders. These orders 
are transmitted through a clearly defined hierarchy and are followed to the letter. 
Their operation rests on strict discipline which is rigidly enforced at all levels of the 
hierarchy. The transmission of information is one way, with no ability to question 
orders and no feedback from lower in the hierarchy. Individual members of this 
structure are treated as components, trained to complete their task efficiently and 
unquestioningly. This is, of course, something of a caricature and one, as that we have 
seen, was modified in practice. However, if there have been elements of truth in this 
picture, then it does not account for the full range of military forms.  
 
I want here to bring in a passage from an interview conducted with Sir Charles 
Tidbury, a former chairman of Whitbread, that alerted me to the potential complexity 
of military practice.  During this interview, on the formation of strategies in the 
brewing industry, he commented as follows: 
 
 And I always said one thing we must never do is fight toe to toe with Allied or 
Bass or nowadays I would say Scottish and Newcastle.  Because if we get 
clipped it will just be like a punch from Joe Louis and we shall be out of the 
ring.  I mean we had to dance around and that came back from this idea,  [the] 
rifleman’s technique of the red coats and the green jackets.  
 
Later he commented of another chairman 
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 He was a great fellow of great experience, he was a guardsman and they are 
marvellous.  You say you’re going to attack that, eight of you are going to be 
killed and we’re going to do it like that, they’re all marching towards it and 
they will do it like that and we were taught really to think round the problems.   
 
These comments suggested the variety of military practice; they also suggested that 
there might be value in exploring these varieties in more detail, especially as they had 
clearly influenced organisational practice (or were being used to illustrate that 
organisational practice). 
 
 
Military practice, then, comprises a variety of organisational forms. We can broadly 
conceive of a distinction between ‘heavy’ and ‘light’ units, a distinction which might 
be nicely contrasted, for the British army, in the regimental titles of Guards and Green 
Jackets. The Guards regiments are those which best correspond to the conventional 
view, regiments in which the emphasis is centrally on tight discipline and hierarchy. 
In this, their lineage from the Frederickian tradition of tightly drilled bodies of men 
executing identical manoeuvres under strict discipline is clear. However, Morgan 
recognises above that this legacy was a contested one. It began to be contested in the 
revolutionary wars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Bryant, 1972: 
Gates, 1987; Gates, 1994; Strachan, 1983). In America but especially in France, the 
great massed ranks of armies schooled in Frederickian techniques were out-
manoeuvred and out-fought by light infantry. Wearing uniforms which helped them to 
blend in with their surrounding (hence the Green Jackets) and armed with the newly 
developed rifle, these bodies of men fought in loose groups. Their organisational form 
 19
was characterised by a considerable degree of autonomy in the field, with non-
commissioned officers enabled to take decisions when contact might be lost in the 
heat of battle. Officers were expected to undertake the same training as their ranks 
and to lead by example as opposed to by fear. This was a dramatically different model 
to that of Frederick and it spread rapidly to most armies (although not without 
resistance from officers who perceived that such developments threatened their 
position and authority).   
 
We have to be careful to acknowledge the deep conservatism of military practice. 
Despite the success of light units in campaigns such as the Peninsular War, there was 
resistance to learning from this. The light units were for many years looked down 
upon by more traditional elements in the officer class, which ensured that little was 
learned from them in, for example, the training of soldiers (Speirs, 1992; Skelley, 
1977). However, a recent work on the contemporary British Army points to an 
influence of the Green Jackets beyond their numbers, particularly in terms of senior 
ranking officers. ‘They prided themselves,’ writes Beevor (1991: 340-1), ‘on having 
more imagination and a less restricted outlook than the Guards. With a tradition of 
semi-independent action dating back to the eighteenth century, their soldiers were 
always considered brighter than average, and officers were picked as much for their 
intellect as for their social connections.’ What we have, then, is a sharp contrast 
within military practice itself. On the one hand we have the heavy regiments, typified 
by the Guards regiments. Such units have taken on many of the lessons learned from 
the experience of their light counterparts, but they tended to be exemplified by tight 
discipline and strict hierarchies, with officers drawn from particular social groups and 
a considerable gulf between them and the ranks. On the other we have the light units, 
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characterised by a considerable degree of responsible autonomy being granted to the 
rank and file, especially in battlefield situations. It is interesting to note in this a 
strong similarity between this and Ciborra’s notions of tactics (‘tactics, ruses, 
improvisations, of which drifting is the product and outcome, [which] are contingent 
procedures indexed by the here and now, and meaningless outside a specific time-
tagged situation’) in strong distinction to the image of rule-following automatons 
under the threat of strict discipline. However, we do need to emphasise that these 
troops were subject to central discipline and worked within a framework marked by 
hierarchy and orders from above (Gates, 1987: 101). What we would also note is the 
strong cultivation of the identification with the regiment, through the centrality of the 
regimental history conveyed through symbols and stories.  In this, the light regiments 
share common elements with their heavy counterparts. The argument is not that the 
light units represent a completely alternative form of organisation, but rather that they 
demonstrate the complexity of military practice. In this, they perhaps suggest 
alternative ways of looking at other organizational forms. We return, therefore, to the 
implications of this discussion for organizational theory. 
 
Implications for organization theory 
 
In the work already cited, Ciborra argues that  
 
 If we draw the full consequences of imagining an economy filled by 
ephemeral, knowledge-based organizations, able to move, disassemble, and 
reconfigure themselves to meet customer demands and technological 
innovations ... we need to shift gears, and drop the language of planning, 
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controlling, and measuring through which organizations, teams, and projects 
have been managed so far (Ciborra, 2002: 103). 
 
Of course, it is a matter of empirical enquiry if such ‘ephemeral’ organisations exist 
and operate in this way, but it might be more useful to deploy the contrast between 
Green Jackets and Guards in exploring such organisations. That is, whilst in many 
organisations there is great store placed on terms like ‘empowerment’, with an 
emphasis on situated improvisation and learning, such organisations might still be 
characterised by tight central control with a continuing hierarchy of command. 
However, such control and hierarchy may remain muted with action being taken 
rather in the context of a strong central culture, the building of which might be seen as 
a central task. The analogy with the Green Jackets seems to catch the key attributes of 
such ‘loose-tight’ control much better than looser metaphors.  
 
What we may be doing by our deployment of military practice as synonymous with 
central command and control is setting up a false bi-polar scale. At one end of the 
spectrum are organisations characterized by strict hierarchies, with tightly defined 
offices and information flows which are constrained to vertical flows and marked by 
downward communication. Such organizations are characterized as being functionally 
adapted to the world of Fordist mass production, but to be inappropriate to the 
demands of the ‘Information Age’. The focus here, by contrast, is on the metaphor of 
the network. Such organizations are characterized by low role distance, and by lateral 
communication flows. They are flat in organisational form and accord considerable 
degrees of autonomy to customer facing and operational staff. What such an 
opposition does is to under-estimate the degree to which organisations can combine 
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empowerment with hierarchy. The example of the light infantry units, with their 
strong focus on decentralised decision making supported by strong regimental culture 
might fit many contemporary organisations better than the looser metaphors of the 
network. Of course, the degree to which organisations correspond to the various 
models that we propose is a question for empirical investigation, but the conventional 
use of the military metaphor perhaps conceals features of contemporary organisational 
practice.  
 
Colin Hales (2001: 53) has recently suggested that the organizations that Ciborra and 
others point to are, at best ‘confined to a few recurring and celebrated cases’. For 
most organizations, he argues, there has been rather an intensification of control with 
considerable exaggeration of shifts towards decentralization and autonomous work 
teams. He suggests, in particular, that  
 
 The principle of hierarchy, where there is co-ordination through individual 
vertical responsibility and accountability, has not been abandoned, but 
retained in an attenuated and more efficient form. Centrally-imposed rules, 
designed to give a heavy steer to managerial conduct, have not been torn up 
but have been rewritten to focus on results rather than processes (Hales, 2001: 
54). 
 
I would suggest that the conventional use of the military metaphor acts as a diversion 
away from a deeper consideration of the nature of contemporary organisations. To 
return, for example to the work of Harry, we find a rejection of the supposed 
hierarchical model of the military tradition but with little consideration of the context 
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of managerial activity. His argument, therefore is that he uses ‘management to mean 
what the people who do the managing do; and the management or managers as a 
name for anyone who does the managing’ (Harry, 2001: 16). In such a definition, we 
have a focus on management as an activity and management as a group of people, but 
where is the focus on why these people are managing? As Watson reminds us, it is 
useful to see management in three ways: as activity, as a group of people and as a 
function (Watson, 1994). That is, managers are in place for a reason. Without such a 
conception then the study of management becomes one of a technical activity, 
divorced from its context (Parker, 2002).  
 
This focus on managerial activity to the relative exclusion of context has been the 
subject of recent critique. Hales (2001), for example, argues that we now know a 
considerable amount about what managers do and that the task is now to understand 
what the impacts of this activity are. From a similar perspective, Thomas (2003) also 
concludes that there has been too great a focus on managerial activity and that we 
need to pay more attention to the notion of function. In considering this we could 
argue that hierarchy is functional for a number of reasons. One approach would be to 
argue that hierarchy is a natural function of complex organization (Simon, 1976). In 
this, hierarchy is a rational response to technical demands. By contrast, there is an 
alternative explanation that would focus on the divided nature of society and the need 
to ensure workplace discipline (Carchedi, 1977). However, an argument that 
hierarchies in organizations are a mirror or a translation of military practice is to draw 
our attention away from this debate and from an exploration of the function and 
persistence of hierarchy in organizations. It does so by giving the impression that 
hierarchy is a simple mirroring of practice elsewhere, the mistaken translation of an 
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organizational model that fails to meet the real needs of a different context. Of course, 
it could be argued, and with some validity, that whatever the source of hierarchy in 
organizations, that managers search for models of existing practice that can be 
translated into a different context. That is, hierarchy might fit the needs of an 
organization operating in one context, and it then looks for models of organizing 
elsewhere that have already implemented forms of hierarchy. In this, military forms 
(or engineering models) are adopted because they are available models, regardless of 
their fit against some criteria of ‘efficiency’.  
 
This argument about the source of organizational practice is one that has parallels in 
the debates within history about the origins of management, debates that have some 
resonance for contemporary arguments. Inspired in part by the work of the new 
institutionalists such as Powell and DiMaggio (1991), Roy (1997) argues that the 
military supplied a template for early organisational structures, both in terms of 
existing practices and in terms of the educational formation of significant business 
leaders. Central in this transfer, he argues were the railroads. In arguing this he is 
contradicting the arguments of Chandler and others, who argued that the 
organizational practices of the railroads – clearly defined hierarchies, strict adherence 
to a rule book, uniformed staff – came from the technical demands of railroad 
operation. Clearly, this debate is one that requires further historical investigation, but 
for our purposes its interest lies in the argument we have made about the relative 
weight of economic pressures in the formation of organizational practices against the 
claims of what Powell and DiMaggio would call ‘mimetic isomorphism’, that is, the 
extent to which organizations copy other organizational forms for non-economic 
reasons. Of course, for current organizations, the borrowing of practice might not be 
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from military practice but, say, from sporting models. However, there does seem to be 
some merit in continuing to explore the development of military practice and the ways 
in which this might be drawn upon in contemporary organizations (Pagonis, 1992; 
Davis, 2003). In doing so, we need to be a little more careful in our characterizations 
of that practice. If we set up a notion of ‘hierarchy=military=bad’ against one of 
‘networks=business-=good’ then we may not have to address those features of 
organisational practice that might be more apparent if we operated with a more 
sophisticated model of military practice. The argument is therefore not just about 
whether the command and control metaphor is an ‘accurate’ reflection of military 
practice or whether it is useful in looking at organisations. Rather it is one that 
stresses the performative nature of the military metaphor in organisational analysis. If 
we think that military practice is only hierarchical then this might lead us to set up a 
false bi-polar scale which draws our attention away from the continuing persistence 
and importance of hierarchies in organisations of all types. This is not a question of a 
normative judgement about hierarchies, but about the adequacy of our 
conceptualisations.  
 
This perhaps demonstrates the value of a perspective on language which sees it as 
have an extra-linguistic referent (Norris, 1997; Lopez, 2001). Such a perspective 
allows us to give due weight to the complexity of language whilst still relating this to 
material practices. The important point is not to privilege one or the other, but to 
examine their mutual constitution. Language is often seen as the Achilles Heel of the 
realist position (Inns, 2002; Edwards, Ashmore, and Potter, 1995) However, a 
convincing realist account of metaphor can be presented via the work of, for example, 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Archer (2000) and Lopez (2001, 2003a, 2003b).  Indeed, 
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Lopez points out that it is those who are located in a broadly realist tradition that have 
written most persuasively about the value of metaphor in the natural sciences. (Lopez, 
2003b: 11-13) The problem comes when a writer like Inns (2002) conflates this 
careful work with those who take a naïve ‘scientific realist’ approach. It is fair, 
however, to argue that those from the critical realist tradition who have operated in 
the domain of social science have paid rather less attention to the nature of metaphor 
(Lopez, 2003a: 79). Because of this, the role and nature of metaphor have been under-
examined. This, then, represents an agenda for those who argue that critical realism 
forms a useful basis for the exploration of organizations, an agenda that is already 
being pursued elsewhere (Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer, 2002).  
 
However, what of our exploration of military metaphor? As Morgan argues 
 
 It is vital to understand how different metaphors have come into prominence, 
and how they may advance certain social constructions and social interests 
over others. This agenda defines an enormous piece of work, and, without 
question, it needs to be done (Morgan, 1997: 235).  
 
It has been the task of this article to explore these processes in the context of the use 
of military metaphor. I have suggested that an approach based on critical realism 
offers us the resources to interrogate our use of metaphor more closely, because it 
stresses the need to explore the relationship between metaphor and its external 
referents, and because it supplies a persuasive account of how to approach those 
external referents. Clearly, as recognised within the tradition, further work is required 
to develop this perspective, given that relatively little attention has been paid to it in 
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the past (Fairclough, Jessop and Sayer, 2002). However, this approach perhaps 
suggests a need to concentrate attention on more commonly used metaphors and to 
embed their consideration in their wider context. For example, Fidler noted in his 
study of senior managers that the most common metaphors deployed were military 
ones, something which he and others relate to the formation of significant portions of 
the British business elite (Fidler, 1981: 161; McKibbin, 1998). There is room for 
further exploration of this connection, as there is for consideration of more 
contemporary use of metaphor.  I have argued that our use of the military metaphor in 
organizational analysis has tended to operate with a particular conception of what it is 
that constitutes military practice. This conventional model is based on a reading of 
military practice as involving a command and control model based on the disciplined 
implementation of centrally devised strategy. What this has meant, I have argued, is 
the false polarization of this model against a looser network based model. My 
suggestion is that the investigation of the heterogonous nature of military practice 
reveals an alternative model in which a degree of relative autonomy is granted within 
the framework of a well developed sense of organizational identity and the potential 
for strict discipline. This is not to argue that hierarchy disappears, but that it is 
modified. This might be felt to fit contemporary organizations better than the looser 
models based on network analogies. The danger with the latter is that they tend to 
divert our attention away from the persistence of hierarchy.  A more sophisticated 
appreciation of the complexities of the metaphors that we draw upon may help in our 
understanding of contemporary organizational forms.  
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1 This example is taken from interview data; the interviewee was a former area 
manager for the Midlands brewer Mitchells & Butlers, later part of the Bass group 
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